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Attitudinal Hedonism is a theory of well-being which claims that welfare
consists in states of attitudinal pleasure.1 Fred Feldman characterizes attitudinal 
pleasure as a state of consciousness similar to attitudes of hope and fear or belief
and doubt.2 He employs the term, enjoyment for the relevant conscious state of 
attitudinal pleasure and disenjoyment for attitudinal pain.3 Attitudinal pleasures 
and pains contrast with sensory pleasures like sex or drugs and sensory pains 
like cuts or bruises which are felt with the senses in the same way that 
temperature is felt. So someone who enjoys sitting at home alone to quietly read 
a book experiences not sensory pleasure, but attitudinal pleasure. This makes 
Attitudinal Hedonism a much more plausible theory of well-being than Sensory 
Hedonism which would maintain that activities like quietly reading cannot 
increase one’s welfare even if one enjoys these activities. 
But Attitudinal Hedonism has a different flaw according to Peter de 
Marneffe who claims the view leads to the implausible conclusion that the 
concept of welfare does not apply to beings which are not capable of enjoyment 
or disenjoyment.4 In this paper I’ll defend Attitudinal Hedonism against de 
Marneffe’s objection. I’ll begin by examining de Marneffe’s objection more 
closely and identifying two distinct responses to it. First, I’ll argue that it is not a
1   Feldman (2002), 604-628.
2   Ibid, 605-609.
3   Ibid, 607.
4   de Marneffe (2003), 198.
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problem for Attitudinal Hedonism if the concept of welfare does not apply to the
types of beings de Marneffe imagines. Second, I’ll propose a broader definition 
of attitudinal pleasure which allows us to apply the concept to de Marneffe’s 
hypothetical beings. For this purpose I’ll argue that attitudinal pleasure is the 
subjective satisfaction of desire.
de Marneffe’s Objection: Spock’s Horn
de Marneffe imagines a being called Spock, loosely based on Spock from
Star Trek, but different in some important ways. This Spock is capable of some 
propositional attitudes but not others. Among them he is capable of approval, 
disapproval and belief but not anger, fear or enjoyment.5 In the absence of such 
attitudes, what motivates Spock are his normative judgements. He envisions 
himself as a successful officer of the Starship Enterprise, and eventually realizes 
this goal. He is a good officer who keeps his crew safe and demonstrates 
excellent propensity for rationality and reasoning. de Marneffe claims that if 
Attitudinal Hedonism is true, nothing is prudentially good or bad for Spock due 
to his lack of capacity for (dis)enjoyment. There is nothing that constitutes well-
being, or ill-being, for Spock; he would be equally well off dead or alive. This 
seems intuitively wrong to de Marneffe who thinks that Spock can be well off or
badly off despite his lack of capacity for certain attitudes.6 This leads to what I’ll
call “Spock’s Horn”: we must either reject our intuitions about Spock or reject 
Attitudinal Hedonism, and de Marneffe chooses the latter.7 His argument might 
be reconstructed as:
(P1): If Attitudinal Hedonism (AH) is true, then Spock cannot be 
well off or badly off. 
5   Ibid. 
6   Ibid. 199.
7   Ibid. 200.
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(P2): Spock can be well off or badly off.
(C): So, AH is false. 
Feldman is unlikely to be moved by de Marneffe’s objection. In her 
review of Feldman’s book, Serena Olsaretti rejects the Spock objection as 
relying on too narrow a view of attitudinal pleasure.8 In fact Feldman later 
expanded his paper into a book which includes a larger list of pro-attitudes that 
count as attitudinal pleasure by his lights. To enjoyment he adds being pleased, 
glad or delighted as well as contentment or satisfaction with one’s life.9 Despite 
Spock’s lack of capacity for certain pro-attitudes, it seems that he is still capable 
of contentment and satisfaction with his own life. Olsaretti sees this as enough to
escape de Marneffe’s objection but she also argues that Feldman’s book fails to 
give a adequate  account of what exactly counts as attitudinal pleasure.10  
This leaves us with two ways of responding to de Marneffe. We could 
take a broad view of attitudinal pleasure and reject premise P1 of Spock’s Horn 
and assert that according to AH there is such a thing as welfare for Spock. But 
this would require a proper definition of what attitudinal pleasure actually is. 
Feldman’s description is vague and incohesive, it isn’t clear what unifies the 
attitudes he lists. Alternatively, we could reject P2 and assert that though the 
concept of welfare does not apply Spock, this does not constitute a serious 
problem for AH. In this paper, I’ll undertake both tasks. First I’ll adopt a narrow 
view of attitudinal pleasure as de Marneffe does and argue that our intuitions 
about Spock are mistaken. Then I’ll adopt a broad view of attitudinal pleasure 
and argue for a definition of it endorsed by Chris Heathwood, specifically that 
welfare the subjective satisfaction of desire.11 Although I find this broader view 
of attitudinal pleasure the more plausible approach, either approach is a 
8   Olsaretti (2007), 412n5. 
9   Feldman (2004), 50, 56. 
10   Olsaretti (2007), 411-412.
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sufficient objection to de Marneffe. 
The Narrow View of Pleasure: Spock Has No Capacity for Welfare
I’ll begin with the narrow view of attitudinal pleasure according to which
it is synonymous with (dis)enjoyment. Under this view of pleasure Attitudinal 
Hedonism implies that it doesn't make sense to speak of Spock's welfare. But 
our intuition goes against this conclusion; it does make sense to speak of his 
welfare despite Spock's incapacity for (dis)enjoyment. Thus there are two 
important tasks which must be accomplished to defend Attitudinal Hedonism. 
First, our intuitions about Spock must be explained. Second, a rejection of our 
intuitions must be justified.
Explaining Our Intuitions
To begin explaining why we intuitively believe there is a sense in which 
Spock can be well off or not, we must make the distinction between well-
being/welfare and prudential value. This subtle distinction is not often 
acknowledged. Whereas welfare and well-being are synonymous, prudential 
value is what contributes to welfare or well-being. As Tim E. Taylor puts it, 
some good X has positive prudential value for S if it increases S’s well-being.12 
Taylor gives the example of a prisoner on death row who is eating his last meal 
before execution.13 The meal itself has positive prudential value because it raises
his well-being, slightly. But overall, the prisoner’s well-being is bound to be 
low. He has endured horrible conditions on death row for a long time, and he is 
about to die. As an analogy we might say that one’s welfare or well-being is like 
one’s bank account and withdrawals and deposits are like goods with negative or
11   Heathwood (2006), 539-563. 
12   Taylor (2013), 12.
13   Ibid. 10. 
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positive prudential value.14 If Spock cannot be well off, then there are no goods 
which are of any prudential value to Spock. 
However, Taylor also identifies another often overlooked distinction, the 
distinction between potential and actual prudential value. A good has potential 
prudential value if it is the sort of thing that will generally make someone’s life 
go better, and this potential value is only realized once the good actually impacts
someone’s well-being.15 Returning to the death row example, the steak only has 
potential prudential value until the prisoner eats and enjoys it, thus realizing this 
potential value and converting it into actual value. This is only possible because 
the prisoner enjoys steak and is able to eat it. If he were a vegan, or had no teeth,
the steak would merely have potential value for the prisoner, and this potential 
would go unrealized. One way to make sense of our intuitions about Spock is to 
say that any and all goods have merely potential prudential value for him. We 
intuitively feel that making rank on the Enterprise is good for Spock because we 
recognize that it has potential prudential value. What we fail to acknowledge is 
that this potential cannot be realized by Spock. However, just as we might give 
dentures to someone so they can eat steak, perhaps we could give some 
cybernetic implant to Spock which allows him to feel enjoyment.16
Another way we might explain our intuitions is to say that we project the 
idea of welfare onto Spock because of our psychological altruism, our evolved 
tendency to sometimes disregard our own self-interest for the sake of others. 
This evolutionary phenomenon is one way of explaining why group members 
14   Ibid. 11.
15   Ibid.
16   Perhaps we are even obligated to do so in the same way we might be obligated to 
provide amputees with prosthetics, or the blind with artificial eyes. It might be much 
easier to swallow the fact that Spock has no welfare naturally, if we had the technology to
give him one artificially. This is an interesting line of thinking that I do not have the time 
to explore here. 
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tend to take care of each other, though culture and genetics contribute to this 
motivation as well.17 I argue that this evolutionary factor would cause us to care 
about autonomous sentient beings such as Spock, even if those beings 
technically fail to satisfy the conditions for well-being. We can see why it would
be advantageous for Captain Kirk and the rest of the crew to be inclined to 
attend to Spock's putative welfare and act accordingly. This would explain 
Captain Kirk and the crew's inclination to be altruistic to Spock which I take to 
be an obvious way for the crew of a vessel to behave with respect to one 
another. Even if these intuitions technically are false beliefs, they serve the 
useful purpose of promoting unity and cohesion on the Enterprise. 
Rejecting Our Intuitions
I’ve just identified a useful aspect of our intuitions about Spock, but I 
want to argue for a rejection of those intuitions. Whatever their usefulness, we 
should not behave any differently towards Spock even if we reject those 
intuitions. We can admit that de Marneffe’s Spock does  not have the capacity 
for welfare while denying this is particularly problematic for Attitudinal 
Hedonism. Just because Spock lacks the capacity for well-being  it does not 
follow that it would be permissible to treat him as if he had no moral worth. It 
would still be morally wrong to remove him unjustly from his post, to kill him 
or to deprive him of his rational capacities. Additionally, de Marneffe posits that 
Spock is motivated by normative judgements.18 So as long as there are 
normative considerations apart from prudential welfare, Spock would not view 
himself as equally well off dead as alive. If you asked Spock whether he’d prefer
to maintain his rational capacities or not, he’d likely answer he’d rather maintain
them. Spock just has different motivations for answering these questions in these
17   Sober and Wilson (1999), 296-305, 324-326. 
18   de Marneffe (2003), 198-199. 
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ways. He might make the normative judgement that good examples of his 
species maintain their lives and rational capacities. He would be a bad example 
of his species if he lacked these goods, so they’re good for him in the 
perfectionist sense rather than the prudential sense. Any given state of affairs 
could be good for Spock morally, aesthetically, or perfectionistically, all of 
which are normative considerations aside from well-being. Thus, the actual 
implications of Spock not satisfying the conditions for well-being are not as 
drastic as de Marneffe suggests, and Attitudinal Hedonism remains a plausible 
theory of welfare. 
The Broad View of Pleasure: Spock's Welfare
I now turn to the broad view of attitudinal pleasure which rejects P1 of 
Spock’s Horn. This view of attitudinal pleasure counters de Marneffe’s objection
by claiming that Spock does indeed have the relevant pro-attitudes necessary for
welfare. This is the view Olsaretti holds19 but she argues this broad view is an 
inadequate account of attitudinal pleasure because of its lack of specificity and 
conceptual unity. If we’re going to use the broad view to counter de Marneffe, 
we’ll have to provide a specific definition of attitudinal pleasure. I propose the 
definition of attitudinal pleasure endorsed by Chris Heathwood.20 Attitudinal 
pleasure is the subjective satisfaction of desire. This definition encompasses all 
of the attitudinal pleasures that Feldman posits: enjoyment, being pleased, glad, 
delighted, satisfied, or content.21 It also clearly allows us to apply the concept of 
welfare to Spock's condition since de Marneffe denies Spock a capacity for 
enjoyment but he admits that Spock has goals he wants to achieve.22 This 
19   Olsaretti (2007), 412n5.
20   Heathwood (2006), 539-563.
21   Feldman (2004), 50, 56.
22   de Marneffe (2003), 198-199.
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definition of attitudinal pleasure will surely face objections, which I turn to now.
Heathwood’s Good Life: Is it Really Hedonism?
It might seem as though I’ve now abandoned Attitudinal Hedonism in favor of 
another theory, Desire-Satisfactionism. But the beauty of this definition, as Heathwood 
argues, is it reveals that Attitudinal Hedonism and Desire-Satisfactionism are the very 
same theory, described in different ways.23 In short, this is because the two theories do not
disagree about the evaluation of lives. Heathwood argues that it would be extremely 
difficult to imagine a case where an agent desires a state of affairs, believes this desire to 
be fulfilled, and yet fails to enjoy, be pleased, glad, delighted, satisfied, or content about 
that state of affairs. Thus Attitudinal Hedonism and Desire Satisfactionism are the same 
theories of welfare because they wholly agree about what the good life looks like.24 
However, Heathwood also claims that attitudinal pleasure reduces to the 
basic attitudes of desire and belief. One might claim the view is not purely 
Hedonist since it identifies goods other than pleasure as having intrinsic value, 
namely fulfilled desires.25 But this argument would be mistaken. Fulfilled 
desires do not have value on their own, they require that some agent be aware of
the fulfillment. Heathwood gives an example of meeting a sick stranger on a 
train and desiring that the stranger recovers their health.26 Weeks after you’ve 
parted ways, the stranger has indeed recovered their health, but it seems 
incorrect to say your welfare has increased because of this. This demonstrates 
that fulfilled desires on their own don’t have value, one must be aware they have
been fulfilled, at which point attitudinal pleasure is obtained. So attitudinal 
pleasure remains what is truly of value.  
23   Heathwood (2006), 556-560.
24   Ibid.
25   Defining a purely Hedonist view as Olsaretti does (2007), 413. 
26   Heathwood (2006), 543. 
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False Beliefs and Defective Desires
Heathwood is also convinced that one obtains attitudinal pleasure if they 
falsely believe a desire has been fulfilled.27 Feldman instead posits that taking 
pleasure in true beliefs is more valuable than taking pleasure in false ones.28 I 
side with Heathwood on this issue but even still we have good reason to prefer 
taking pleasure in true beliefs rather than false ones. It isn’t that truth modifies 
the value of pleasure but rather that taking pleasure in true beliefs increases the 
likelihood that the attitudinal pleasure will persist over time. Consider two men 
both of whom desire that their wives be faithful and take attitudinal pleasure in 
believing this is the case. For the first man this belief is true, his wife is faithful. 
But for the second it is false, his wife is secretly cheating on him.29 I maintain 
that both men feel equal amounts of attitudinal pleasure but there is a chance the
second man will eventually learn the truth, at which point his pleasure will 
cease.30 
One more objection to consider is defective desire. Olsaretti argues that 
attitudinal pleasure is distinct from desire because we sometimes remain 
unpleased from fulfilling desires or find ourselves pleased by states of affairs we
did not previously desire.31 But Heathwood has a good response to this.32 First 
he considers a case where he desires froot loops after remembering them from 
27   Ibid. 556.
28   Feldman (2002), 614-616.
29   Feldman uses a similar example. It may be said that since Feldman and Heathwood 
evaluate the lives of these men differently, they use different theories. This is true. But 
Feldman is using an adjusted version of Attitudinal Hedonism. The more basic form of 
Attitudinal Hedonism is still identical to Desire-Satisfactionism, as Heathwood claims. 
30   This analysis also side-steps the argument that Attitudinal Hedonism values truth for 
its own sake. The belief that one’s wife is faithful only generates attitudinal pleasure if 
one desires their wife to be faithful. A man in an open marriage on the other hand, does 
not desire his wife to be faithful, and so receives no benefit from believing she is 
regardless of if this belief is true or not. 
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his childhood but once he acquires the cereal, he finds he dislikes the overly 
sweet taste. Heathwood argues that once he bit into the froot loops, he lost the 
desire for them. About being pleased at something we did not previously desire, 
he offers the example of his wife surprising him with a back massage; as soon as
his wife begins the massage, he also forms a desire for it he did not have before. 
Essentially Heathwood is arguing that the cases Olsaretti seems to have in mind 
ignore the element of time, an argument I find convincing which defends the 
claim that Attitudinal Hedonism and Desire-Satisfactionism are the same 
theory.33 
What is Good for Spock?
Given this view of attitudinal pleasure as the subjective satisfaction of 
desire, we can see that Spock does indeed have a capacity for welfare according 
to Attitudinal Hedonism. But it does appear that Spock is not capable of 
achieving welfare to the same degree that humans do. Spock has desires he can 
satisfy but the states of attitudinal pleasure he can have are limited by his lack of
capacity for certain pro-attitudes. Spock appears to be capable of contentment 
and satisfaction, but not enjoyment. We might say that Spock’s attitudinal 
pleasures are not as intense as humans', which explains Spock’s cold and stoic 
nature. But this is of little consequence, just as Spock’s incapacity for welfare 
under the narrow view turned out to be of little consequence. Spock’s lesser 
capacity for attitudinal pleasure surely does not affect his moral standing as an 
31   Olsaretti (2007), 411. She also says Feldman shares this claim with her, but her 
citations make it unclear where exactly Feldman makes this claim. 
32   Heathwood (2006), 558.
33   There is the issue of which moniker to use. Even though the theories evaluate lives 
identically, I think it is more semantically appropriate to use the name Attitudinal 
Hedonism given that the actual intrinsic good is still attitudinal pleasure. Whereas 
fulfilled desires are a mere component of attitudinal pleasure. 
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autonomous and sentient being. All this really means is that, for example, if you 
have a delicious apple that you want to gift to someone on the Enterprise, it 
makes more sense for you to give it to Kirk (or another human) than Spock. But 
Spock is likely to agree with this conclusion anyway, provided he has consumed 
enough calories for the day. Spock might be contented by the apple whereas 
Kirk might be delighted by it, so it is perfectly logical to give the apple to Kirk. I
don’t see this as a problem for Attitudinal Hedonism.
Conclusion
In this paper I’ve defended Attitudinal Hedonism by responding to de 
Marneffe’s objection that according to AH, the concept of welfare cannot apply 
to beings who cannot experience (dis)enjoyment. I argued that de Marneffe is 
either mistaken about the consequences of this incapacity for welfare, or else 
mistaken that they lack the capacity in the first place. I’ve also argued that 
Attitudinal Hedonism and Desire-Satisfactionism are the same theory, due to the
definition of attitudinal pleasure being the subjective fulfillment of desire. There
are of course more objections that might be raised against Attitudinal Hedonism 
besides de Marneffe’s. But I’ve focused on his since they apply broadly to any 
form of Attitudinal Hedonism whereas other objections often attack special 
variants.34 I’m currently of the belief that Attitudinal Hedonism is the closest 
thing we have to a true theory of welfare, and thus it is important to defend its 
plausibility.  
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